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REFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
“LEAN IN” OR “LEAVE” 
 





The adoption of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute by 120 
States on July 17, 1998, marked an uneasy revolution in international law 
and practice.1 A response to the devastation wrought by two world wars and 
countless regional and national conflicts,2 it was negotiated just after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, but still in the shadow of possible 
nuclear war.  The hopes the Statute embodied exemplified faith and 
optimism in the capacity of international law and international institutions 
to help human society create organizing structures and principles to contain 
violence and create a more peaceful world.  During what was essentially a 
constitutional convention to establish the Court, the negotiators decided that 
the Court would have inherent—and universal—jurisdiction over three 
 
* Leila Nadya Sadat is the James Carr Professor of International Criminal Law and Director, 
Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute, Washington University School of Law, St. Louis; Special 
Adviser on Crimes Against Humanity to the ICC Prosecutor since 2012. This Essay is an adaption of a 
lecture given at Oxford University’s Blavatnik School of Government on May 13, 2019, and represents 
the personal views of the author, not the official views of any organ of the International Criminal Court.  
The Essay is based upon the author’s experiences as an attendee of the Rome Conference and her 
participation in the establishment of the entities described in this article. The author thanks Federica 
d’Alessandra, Ivo Gruév, and the other participants in the Oxford Workshop for helpful feedback, and 
Madaline George, Christian Rose, and Sam Blankenship for research assistance.  
1. Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy 
Revolution, 88 GEO. L. J. 381 (2000); see also LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
(2002) [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM].  
2. An estimated 170 million people died in more than 250 conflicts that took place after World War 
II. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps 
and Ambiguities, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 203 (1998). 
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crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious war crimes.3  
Overlaid upon that “inherent jurisdiction” would be important limits, 
however: in situations referred to the Court by States or the Prosecutor, 
either the State of the accused’s nationality or the State on the territory in 
which the crimes were committed would have to be parties to the Statute or 
otherwise consent to the Court’s jurisdiction.4 (They imposed no 
jurisdictional preconditions for referrals made by the UN Security 
Council5). Moreover, even in cases in which jurisdiction is present, the 
principle of complementarity they inserted into the Statute means that the 
Court will be a court of last, not first, resort.  If any State with jurisdiction—
whether a party to the treaty or not—is investigating or prosecuting the same 
individual for the same conduct, that case becomes inadmissible before the 
Court.6 Finally, they gave the Prosecutor a proprio motu power to refer 
situations to the Court on her or his own initiative, subject to a decision of 
the Pretrial Chamber that the statutory criteria were met.7  
At the time of the Court’s creation, euphoria and skepticism about both 
the utility and the ability of the Court to be successful were present in equal 
measure. Many of my peers and colleagues thought it could take decades to 
achieve the sixty ratifications necessary to bring the treaty into force, and 
were surprised when that goal was achieved after only four years.  
The NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), which 
began campaigning for the Court in 1995, set as its goals for the treaty a 
fair, effective and independent Court. As I wrote in an essay last summer, 
twenty years after Rome, the Court has become operational and these 
objectives can now be assessed and measured rather than speculated upon, 
although it is difficult to predict the long-term impact of the Court’s activity 
at this early stage.8 With more than nine hundred staff hailing from one 
 
3.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Rome Statute].  
4.  Id. art. 12. 
5.  Id. art. 13(b). 
6.  Id. art. 17; see also Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-565, Judgment on the Appeal of Al-
Senussi on Admissibility (July 24, 2014).  
7.  Rome Statute art. 17. 
8.  Leila Nadya Sadat, Politics, Procedure, and Law: Three Continuing Challenges for the ICC in its 
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hundred different countries9 and 123 States Parties,10 the Court has grown 
considerably faster than experts predicted.  It now has eleven situations 
under investigation, twenty-seven cases pending or complete, and ten 
preliminary examinations under way.  
As a “justice start up,”11 tasked with investigating and prosecuting the 
“most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole,”12 the ICC is, by definition, an institution charged with bringing the 
rule of law into some of the most difficult and dangerous situations in the 
world. This mission requires it to confront State power on an ongoing basis. 
Transforming the complex and heavily negotiated provisions of the Statute 
into a blueprint for a functioning international institution has been both 
exhilarating and exhausting for those involved.  
The Court has had some significant successes, including convictions of 
individuals for serious crimes. These include enlistment, recruitment, and 
use of child soldiers (Prosecutor v. Lubanga)13 and attacks upon cultural 
property and heritage (Prosecutor v. al-Mahdi).14 The recent acquittals of 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo15 and Laurent Gbagbo,16 however, meant that 
the Court had yet to successfully prosecute anyone for sexual violence until 
the 2019 Trial Chamber judgment in Prosecutor v. Ntaganda.17   The 
creation of the Trust Fund for Victims and a reparations process is also a 
 
9.  About the Court, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about [https://perma.cc/8JVP-VCSE].  
Of these, and not including elected officials and language staff, the Court had 432 Professional Staff 
with ninety-three nationalities as of July 31, 2018.  International Criminal Court Assembly of States 
Parties, Report of the Bureau on Equitable Geographical Representation and Gender Balance in the 
Recruitment of Staff of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/17/36, ¶ 7, https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP17/ICC-ASP-17-36-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DKB-RGVT].  These 
figures include fifty-nine nationals from non-States Parties, representing approximately twelve percent 
of the Court’s staff.  Id. at ¶ 21.  
10.  About the Court, supra note 9. 
11.  Interview with Christine Chung, former ICC Prosecutor, in THE RECKONING: THE BATTLE FOR 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Public Broadcasting Service 2009).   
12.  Rome Statute Preamble, cl.4. 
13.  Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment Pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute (Mar. 
14, 2012). 
14.  Prosecutor v. al-Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, Judgment and Sentence (Sept. 27, 2016). 
15.  Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, Judgment Pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute (Mar. 
21, 2016). 
16.  Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15-1263, Reasons for Oral Decision of 15 January 2019 
(July 16, 2019).  
17.  Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-2359, Judgment (July 8, 2019).  
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plus, as well as the Court’s focus on victim participation, but even these 
positive innovations had difficult starts.18  
From its inception, the International Criminal Court has had its critics. 
The Court’s challenges have included critiques of its legitimacy from States 
and non-States Parties alike, difficulties apprehending defendants (fifteen 
of whom are at large as of this writing19), lengthy trials involving difficulties 
of proof, and problematic jurisprudence and jurisprudential methodologies 
in several areas of the law.  Critics have alleged that the Court is both too 
strong and too weak;20 that it has targeted Africa because it is a tool of the 
West,21 or, alternatively, that it has brought politically motivated 
prosecutions against Western states;22 that the Prosecutor has targeted 
defendants who are too high-ranking to be brought before the Court,23 or 
has, conversely, only brought cases against low-level accused.24 As Darryl 
Robinson has observed, it seems that no matter what it does, “the ICC 
cannot win.”25 The Court occupies—to paraphrase the late Judge Patricia 
Wald, who served at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY)—“a small center in a whirling international vortex” in 
 
18.  See, e.g., Stephen Lamony, What are the Benefits and Difficulties of Victim Participation at the 
International Criminal Court?, HUMANITY UNITED (May 4, 2015), https://humanityunited.org/what-
are-the-benefits-and-difficulties-of-victim-participation-at-the-international-criminal-court-icc/ 
[https://perma.cc/U5CR-DPW8]. 
19.  Defendants at Large, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/defendants?k=At%20large 
[https://perma.cc/GX9G-YUFR]. 
20.  See Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 
(2003). 
21.  See, e.g., Adam Taylor, Why So Many African Leaders Hate the International Criminal Court, 
WASH. POST (June 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/15/why-
so-many-african-leaders-hate-the-international-criminal-court/?utm_term=.6c8454353aab 
[https://perma.cc/6ZTR-M59V]. 
22.  See, e.g., Thierry Cruvellier, Can the International Criminal Court Be Saved From Itself?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/17/opinion/icc-symbolic-migrants-
europe.html [https://perma.cc/9W4B-WQ7Q] (expressing doubt as to the likelihood of success of the 
Court’s investigations into US actions in Afghanistan due to the probable lack of cooperation from the 
states involved, and contending that the primary reason for the investigations is to silence criticisms that 
the Court is only targeting Africa). 
23.  See, e.g., Simon Tisdall, Bashir Slips out of Court’s Grasp, THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 2009), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/jun/11/sudan-law [https://perma.cc/228P-9NZ8] 
(recounting criticisms from African and Western officials alike). 
24.  See, e.g., William A. Schabas, The Banality of International Justice, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 545, 
550 (2013) (arguing that the ICC has found excuses to not go after harder cases, focusing instead on 
prosecuting “global pariahs”). 
25.  Darryl Robinson, Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal Court Cannot Win, 28 
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which almost everything it does “has political implications.”26 Thus a 
certain degree of criticism is inevitable, and given the many setbacks the 
Court has had recently, warranted.27  Yet in the past two years the Court has 
faced an avalanche of criticism that seems different in both degree and kind 
from before. There is now the beginning of a “Leave” campaign regarding 
the ICC, rather like the “Leave” campaigns waged in regard to other 
international institutions, including the European Union.28 In Part II, this 
Essay examines the fledgling ICC “Leave” campaign. In Part III, it suggests 
why the ICC remains important and how it can be reformed. Finally, the 
Essay notes that the criticisms of perversity, futility, and jeopardy currently 
levied against the Court ignore, as Albert Hirschman’s Rhetoric of 
Reaction29 predicts, the potential positive impact of the ICC over the long 
term. For this reason, I conclude that given the continued need for the ICC 
and the probability of successful reform, the most appropriate course is to 
“Lean In” to ICC reform, continue to support the Court, and work hard to 
advance the human values that the Court’s establishment embodied.  
 
I. THE ICC “LEAVE” CAMPAIGN 
 
As noted earlier, the ICC currently has 123 States Parties and 139 
signatories. As the Court has plunged into its work, some States that joined 
either fully or partially appear to have experienced buyer’s remorse. The 
current governments of some States that ratified the Statute clearly do not 
like being the targets—or potential targets—of ICC investigations. Burundi 
withdrew after investigations began of crimes allegedly committed in its 
territory,30 and the Philippines withdrew following the Office of the 
 
26.  Patricia A. Wald, Running the Trial of the Century: The Nuremberg Legacy, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1559, 1581-82 (2006).  
27.  James A. Goldston, Don't Give Up on the ICC, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 8, 2019), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/08/dont-give-up-on-the-icc-hague-war-crimes/ 
[https://perma.cc/D6C7-C9K8]. 
28.  Brexit: All You Need to Know About the UK Leaving the EU, BBC (Sept. 16, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887 [https://perma.cc/N5NH-6ES7]. 
29.  ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY 
(1991). 
30.  INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, REPORT ON PRELIMINARY 
EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES ¶ 289 (2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017-PE-rep/2017-
otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2NV-TJZN]. 
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Prosecutor’s (OTP) launch of a Preliminary Examination into its actions.31 
South Africa has periodically debated withdrawal for some time; as of this 
writing, however, it remains a state party.  
Other States signed the Statute but subsequently sent letters indicating 
their intention not to ratify the Statute after experiencing a change of 
government or the possibility their nationals could be indicted. These 
include the United States,32 Israel,33 and the Russian Federation.34 The 
situation involving the United States has been particularly fraught since the 
Statute’s adoption. The Clinton administration was lukewarm about the idea 
prior to and during the Rome Conference, and the United States adopted a 
defensive and ultimately negative position towards the Court as the 
negotiations proceeded.35 As is well known, the U.S. delegation demanded 
a vote on the Statute on the final day of the Rome Conference, a decision 
that resulted in its own humiliation as Statute was adopted by a vote of 120-
7.36 Although the United States ultimately signed the Statute on December 
31, 2000, U.S. ambivalence turned to outright hostility during the 
presidency of George W. Bush. The Bush administration attempted to 
“unsign” the Statute,37 and supported the adoption of federal legislation 
preventing the U.S. government from cooperating with the Court.38 It also 
 
31.  Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Statement on The Philippines’ Notice of Withdrawal: State 
Participation in Rome Statute System Essential to International Rule of Law (Mar. 20, 2018), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1371 [https://perma.cc/9XL6-YUCH]. 
32.  Letter from John R. Bolton, U.S. Under Sec’y of State for Arms Control & Int’l Sec., to Kofi 
Annan, United Nations Sec’y Gen. (May 6, 2002), https://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm [https://perma.cc/NBW8-Q7MP]. 
33.  Status of Treaties: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
10&chapter=18&lang=en#3 [https://perma.cc/U2E4-XQQR]. 
34.  Id. 
35.  See Sadat & Carden, supra note 1, at 447-52. 
36.  Press Release, United Nations, U.N. Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision to 
Establish Permanent International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release L/2889 (July 20, 1998), 
https://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980720.l2889.html [https://perma.cc/NWZ7-A296]. 
37.  Leila Nadya Sadat, Summer in Rome, Spring in the Hague, Winter in Washington? U.S. Policy 
Towards the International Criminal Court, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 557, 557-58 (2003); see also Edward T. 
Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2064-65 (2003). 
38.  Sadat, supra note 37, at 558-59, n.5 (referring to the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-206, tit. II § 2004, 116 Stat. 820, 902 (2002) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7423 
(2004))); see also John R. Bolton, U.S. Under Sec’y for Arms Control & Int’l Sec., Remarks at the 
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conducted a global campaign to immunize U.S. actions and persons from 
the jurisdiction of the Court, pursuant to which more than one hundred 
States signed bilateral immunity (Article 98) agreements with the United 
States guaranteeing that under no circumstances would they turn over a U.S. 
national to the Court.39   
John Bolton, who held various posts in the Bush administration and was 
until recently the National Security Advisor for the Trump administration, 
spearheaded the U.S. campaign against the Court.  Bolton has been one of 
the Court’s most steadfast foes, objecting not only to its activities but to its 
existence.40 On March 15, 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 
announced a policy of U.S. visa restrictions on individuals directly 
responsible for any ICC investigation of U.S. personnel,41 including persons 
who take or have taken action to request or further such an investigation. 
Secretary Pompeo added, “you should know, if you’re responsible for the 
proposed ICC investigation of U.S. personnel in connection with the 
situation in Afghanistan, you should not assume that you will still have or 
will get a visa, or that you will be permitted to . . . enter the United States.”42  
Although he indicated that the United States would respect the U.N. 
Headquarters Agreement,43 presumably allowing ICC personnel to travel 
there to make reports, he threatened not only “visa restrictions” but 
“additional steps, including economic sanctions if the ICC does not change 
its course.”44 In his view, “the ICC is attacking America’s rule of law.  It’s 
 
39.  Currently, the U.S. has concluded 103 agreements, with the final agreement concluded in April 
2007 with Montenegro.  See COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. COURT, STATUS OF U.S. BILATERAL IMMUNITY 
AGREEMENTS (BIAS) http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCFS_BIAstatus_current.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TA2Z-9SD6]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATY ACTIONS: APRIL 2007. 
40.  See John Bolton, The Hague Aims for U.S. Soldiers, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/Articles/the-hague-tiptoes-toward-u-s-soldiers-1511217136 
[https://perma.cc/NX2C-9NS3] (arguing that “the ICC constitutes a direct assault on the concept of 
national sovereignty” and that “America should welcome the opportunity . . . to strangle the ICC in its 
cradle.”). 
41.  Mike Pompeo, Secretary Pompeo Remarks at State Department, C-SPAN (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?458825-1/secretary-pompeo-announces-visa-restrictions-international-
criminal-court-probes-us-military [https://perma.cc/7BYB-DEWK]. 
42.  Id. Pompeo added that “[t]hese visa restrictions may also be used to deter ICC efforts to pursue 
allied personnel, including Israelis, without allies’ consent.” Id. 
43.  See Agreement Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, U.N.-U.S., art. IV, June 26, 
1947, 61 Stat. 3416 (requiring the United States to refrain from impos[ing] any impediments” to certain 
individuals travelling to the UN headquarters in New York). 
44.  Pompeo, supra note 41. 
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not too late for [the court] to change course and we urge them to do so 
immediately.”45  
Academics have also become increasingly critical of the Court over the 
past year or two. This includes Douglas Guilfoyle (an Australian academic 
now serving as a fellow with the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs) 
who recently wrote on EJILTalk!: “I am tempted by the idea that the ICC 
should not have been established as a permanent standing court with a seat 
in The Hague, but primarily as a mechanism for assisting the creation of 
special chambers in national legal systems with international elements.”46  
Guifoyle’s thinking parallels the arguments levied against the European 
Union in the United Kingdom, which position national sovereignty and 
local decision making as fundamentally incompatible with participation in 
international institutions. Rather than reform, these assertions, whether 
proposed by academics like Guilfoyle or politicians like Bolton, suggest that 
“Exit” or “Leave” is the remedy to the perceived—and real—problems of 
international institutions like the ICC.  
The “Leave” argument goes well beyond the critique of international 
justice advanced by nuanced scholarship urging greater sensitivity to 
domestic processes—particularly non-traditional processes—and less 
emphasis on the criminal justice system as the appropriate response to 
atrocity crimes.47 It is also quite different than criticisms of specific cases 
or procedures that many scholars have mounted against the recent acquittals 
 
45.  Id. The Pretrial Chamber’s decision was praised by conservatives in the United States. See Bret 
Schaefer & Cully Stimson, Opinion, U.S. Must Remain Wary of International Criminal Court Even After 
Decision to Not Target Americans, DAILY SIGNAL (Apr. 12, 2019), 
https://www.dailysignal.com/2019/04/12/us-must-remain-wary-of-international-criminal-court-even-
after-decision-to-not-target-americans/ [https://perma.cc/YSG6-R6YF]. 
46.  Douglas Guilfoyle, Reforming the International Criminal Court: Is it Time for the Assembly of 
State Parties to be the Adults in the Room?, EJIL: TALK! (May 8, 2019) 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/reforming-the-international-criminal-court-is-it-time-for-the-assembly-of-
state-parties-to-be-the-adults-in-the-room/ [https://perma.cc/664Z-CHVQ]. 
47.  For an example of such nuanced scholarship, see MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, 
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of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo,48 Laurent Gbagbo49 or the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber II not to permit the prosecutor to begin an investigation into 
alleged crimes committed on the territory of Afghanistan since 2002.50 That 
is because, at its core, the “Leave” agenda is not a reform agenda. Although 
it promises an eventual return to the abandoned institution in some cases, it 
seems fairly clear that the institution in question, whether the International 
Criminal Court, the United Nations Human Rights Council, or the European 
Union itself, will never be able to satisfy the leaver—the objections run too 
strong and too deep. This is because the driver of the “Leave” campaign is 
ideology, as opposed to practicalities. Although many factors contributed to 
Brexit, the essence of the Brexit campaign was not about economics but 
about yearning for a lost era of “British” (narrowly defined) sovereignty and 
superiority.51 Likewise, the anti-ICC campaign (in the West, and 
particularly in the United States) often seems to be based upon a belief in 
the moral superiority of the United States and its entitlement to operate on 
the battlefield free of legal constraints that might bind other “lesser” nations.  
 That said, there is undoubtedly a spectrum of views within the “Leave” 
camp. Some, like John Bolton, have attacked international institutions, and 
with respect to the International Criminal Court has argued that the goal 
should be causing it to “wither and collapse.”52 Others, like U.S. Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo seem, like many Brexiteers, to assume that the 
institutions do not need to be abolished, so long as their State is not subject 
to their jurisdiction or control.  The remainder of this Essay suggests why 
 
48.  See Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Bemba 
Against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute” (June 8, 2018); Leila 
Nadya Sadat, “Judicial-Speculation-Made-Law:” More Thoughts about the Acquittal of Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo by the ICC Appeals Chamber and the Question of Superior Responsibility under 
the Rome Statute, ICC F. (May 27, 2019), https://iccforum.com/responsibility#Sadat 
[https://perma.cc/93HL-ZMWW]. 
49.  See Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15-1263, Reasons for Oral Decision of 15 January 2019 
(July 16, 2019). 
50.  See Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17, Decision Pursuant to Art.15 of 
the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan (Apr. 12, 2019). 
51.  See generally, e.g., HAROLD D. CLARKE, MATTHEW GOODWIN & PAUL WHITELEY, BREXIT: WHY 
BRITAIN VOTED TO LEAVE THE EUROPEAN UNION (2017). 
52.  Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. Interest?: Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
Int’l Operations of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 28-31 (1998) (statement of Hon. 
John Bolton, Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs; Senior Vice 
President, American Enterprise Institute), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
105shrg50976/html/CHRG-105shrg50976.htm [https://perma.cc/QKE7-R7R9]. 
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the ICC remains important, and argues that, as opposed to a “Leave” 
campaign, academics, politicians and civil society need to “Lean In”53 to 
ICC reform, to allow the Court to become the successful and important 
international institution it can be, and that the founders hoped it would 
become. 
 
II. WHY THE ICC REMAINS IMPORTANT AND HOW IT CAN BE REFORMED 
 
Given the avalanche of criticism recently directed at the Court, it is easy 
to lose sight of the objectives that animated the delegates to the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference in 1998. Additionally, the rise of global 
authoritarianism makes it tempting to conclude that even if the need for the 
Court remains the same as it did in the 1990s, the project is just too difficult 
to undertake in the current political climate.  
An assessment was made in 1998 that one of the factors contributing to 
the extraordinary number of civilian deaths and atrocity crimes committed 
since World War II was the impunity with which those crimes could be 
committed. While international criminal justice was never envisaged as a 
panacea to war in the commission of atrocities, its absence was seen as a 
“green light” to would-be perpetrators. As former High Commissioner for 
Human Rights José Ayala Lasso observed in 1996, following the war in the 
 
53.  SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD (2013). It seems 
particularly appropriate to employ the term “lean in” in a volume celebrating 150 years of women at 
Washington University School of Law. Much of Sandberg’s work is directed towards external and 
internal forces that hold women back in the workplace. This is also true of the ICC, which faces both 
internal and external difficulties. In addition, it would be difficult not to notice that many of the most 
scathing criticisms of the ICC, particularly in the blogosphere, have been leveled by men. See Dapo 
Akande, ICC Appeals Chamber Holds that Heads of State Have No Immunity Under Customary 
International Law Before International Tribunals, EURO. J. OF INT’L L., EJIL: TALK! (May 6, 2019), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-appeals-chamber-holds-that-heads-of-state-have-no-immunity-under-
customary-international-law-before-international-tribunals/ [https://perma.cc/BMB2-MSTG]; Kevin 
Jon Heller, What Happens to the Acquitted?, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 663 (2008); Dov Jacobs, ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber Rejects OTP Request to Open an Investigation in Afghanistan: Some Preliminary 
Thoughts on an Ultra Vires Decision, SPREADING THE JAM (Apr. 12, 2019), 
https://dovjacobs.com/2019/04/12/icc-pre-trial-chamber-rejects-otp-request-to-open-an-investigation-
in-afghanistan-some-preliminary-thoughts-on-an-ultra-vires-decision/ [https://perma.cc/F7FF-YYW5]. 
While this might simply be an unhappy coincidence, there is extensive research on the blogosphere and 
Twitter as “gendered” spaces in which women may feel less comfortable than men. At a minimum, 
women typically write and post in the spaces less often. Jane Murphy & Solangel Maldonado, 










2020]                  Reforming the International Criminal Court 61 
 
 
former Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide, “we must rid this planet of 
the obscenity that a person stands a better chance of being tried and judged 
for killing one human being than for killing 100,000.”54  
Although the ICC has had difficulties fulfilling the expectations of its 
founders, the institution is still relatively young, and the atrocities it was 
intended to combat result from centuries-old ways of thinking about state 
power. Although the Court’s performance may be subpar in some respects, 
the recent conviction of Bosco Ntaganda,55 the Court’s successful potential 
intervention into the situation of the Rohingya in Bangladesh56, and the 
Appeals Chamber’s decision on immunities in the al-Bashir case57 are all 
recent positive developments. There are also serious and concrete efforts at 
reform being made within the ICC itself, and by outsiders hoping for its 
success. This suggests that abandoning the effort is the wrong strategy.  At 
a time of rising authoritarianism, during which some world leaders appear 
to be countenancing high levels of civilian casualties in wartime, acts of 
aggression, and life tenure for themselves, and evoking nationalist and 
sovereigntist arguments to justify the commission of crimes,58 abandoning 
the ICC sends the wrong signal. As James Goldston recently wrote, 
[L]etting [the ICC] die would deliver a huge blow to the 
fight against impunity. Flawed as it is, the ICC remains a 
capstone of our centuries-long search for a world in which 
the law prevails over brute force. Giving up on it now 
would set back that struggle immeasurably and would be a 
grave disservice to the many courageous activists who have 
given their lives for the cause of fighting crimes against 
humanity and genocide.59 
 
54.  Rupp Urges Focus on “Common Ground”: 8,600 Graduate under Sunny Skies, COLUM. UNIV. 
REC. (May 24, 1996), 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/record/archives/vol21/vol21_iss28/record2128.13.html 
[https://perma.cc/AK7K-4U7E]. 
55.  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
56.  See Bangladesh/Myanmar, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/bangladesh-myanmar 
[https://perma.cc/TW5K-BP5B]. 
57.  See Prosecutor v. al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s 
Appeal (May 6, 2019). 
58.  The Takeaway: Trump Administration Moves Ahead with Major Foreign Policy Overhauls amid 
Impeachment Inquiry, NPR (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.npr.org/podcasts/381444253/pri-the-takeaway 
[https://perma.cc/D8L2-JHUF].  
59.  Goldston, supra note 27.  
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A. What Reforms Might be Useful 
1. Procedural Reforms 
 
The difficult political climate within which the Court operates requires 
it to be scrupulous about its trial processes to demonstrate that it is indeed 
fair, effective, and impartial, and able to perform the core tasks assigned to 
it by its Statute. This has, to date, been a real weakness of the institution. 
Trials are too slow, evidence is often insufficiently robust, and the Pretrial 
Chambers, in particular, often issue confusing rulings that are difficult to 
understand and have created difficulties for both the prosecution and the 
defense. During the Preparatory Committee discussions that preceded the 
Rome Conference, the view was often expressed that the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals relied too heavily on common-law 
procedures for their functioning and had become too adversarial.60 This, it 
was thought, was leading to long trial times and delays, problems with 
evidence and excessively lengthy judicial opinions with verbose majority 
and dissenting opinions. There was also considerable concern about having 
an “independent prosecutor” that could bring cases on his or her own 
initiative. As one U.S. State Department official quipped, no one wanted an 
“independent counsel for the universe.”61  
Responding to these and other concerns, during the negotiations, the 
French government introduced a new draft for the Statute that relied much 
more heavily on civil-law procedure. By the time that 165 States and 250 
NGOs had finished with the text on July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute had 
become a curious blend of common- and civil-law procedures that was very 
unlike the Statutes of earlier ad hoc international criminal tribunals. It 
seemed to rely more upon civil-law than common-law ideas, imposing on 
the Prosecutor an obligation to pursue the truth and investigate 
“incrimination and exonerating circumstances equally,”62 allowing the 
defendant to make an unsworn statement to the Court, and allowing all 
evidence that is relevant to the case, excluding only evidence that might be 
unduly prejudicial to the accused’s right to a fair trial.63 
 
60.  See, e.g., Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, The Process of Negotiations, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 217, 220-24 (Roy S. Lee, ed., 1999). 
61.  JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 1, at 229 n. 12 (2002) (referencing the then 
ongoing investigation of U.S. President Bill Clinton by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr). 
62.  Rome Statute art. 54(1)(a).  
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The drafters of the Rome Statute sought to provide a bulwark against 
frivolous or insufficient cases moving forward, as well as streamline and 
make proceedings more efficient. They thought that increasing the Court’s 
reliance upon civil-law criminal procedure and creating a new Pretrial 
Chamber and pre-trial phase of the proceedings would be useful in this 
regard. That has not been the case thus far. For example, the pretrial phase 
of the Lubanga case lasted nearly three years, from March 2006 until the 
opening of the trial in January 2009.  The trial then took another three years, 
and the appeal took an additional two-and-a-half years after that, meaning 
that the case was not “over” until December 1, 2014, eight years after 
Lubanga’s transfer to The Hague.64  In contrast, the ICTY’s first case against 
Duško Tadić took half that time—two years from arrest and transfer to the 
Tribunal to the issuance of the Trial Chamber’s judgment; and an additional 
two years for the appeal.65  
Thus, the addition of the Pretrial Chambers seems to have complicated 
and lengthened proceedings considerably, adding another layer of judicial 
“bureaucracy” to the proceedings. Moreover, because the ICC’s procedure 
is unlike that of predecessor institutions and national courts, practice at the 
ICC is very different from the procedure at the ad hoc tribunals, making it 
difficult to draw upon the “best practices” of those institutions as a shortcut 
for helping the Court become operational and efficient quickly.  
The Pretrial Chambers, for example, initially rejected the notion that the 
prosecution could plead modes of liability in the alternative, requiring the 
case to rest on one theory, even though the use of alternative theories was 
permitted at the ad hoc tribunals (and is now permitted at the ICC).66 This 
then caused the Trial Chambers to rely upon Regulation 55 to 
“recharacterize” the charges, a methodology that was inefficient and subject 
to critique.67 Pretrial Chambers also constructed complicated theories of 
 
64.  See Lubanga Case: Timeline, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/lubanga 
[https://perma.cc/C3QF-DTR6].  
65.  See Tadić (IT-94-1): Case Information Sheet, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, https://www.icty.org/en/case/tadic [https://perma.cc/GD5B-ERZU]. 
66.  Compare Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-1, Decision on Summons to Appear, ¶ 36 (Mar. 8, 
2011) (declining to make findings on both principal and accessory liability in the alternative) with, e.g., 
Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 149 
(Mar. 23, 2016) (retaining an alternative mode of liability in the charges as requested by the Prosecutor). 
67.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3339, Defence’s Document in Support of 
Appeal Against the Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court 
and Severing the Charges Against the Accused Persons (Jan. 10, 2013); see also Dov Jacobs, A Shifting 
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liability in the Court’s early cases, decisions that were often lightly 
footnoted explorations of untested legal theories. Chambers have also 
rejected the practice of “witness proofing”68 and at the same time have 
demanded high levels of corroboration in the proof adduced by the 
prosecution both at the Pretrial and Trial phases.69 They have thus 
endeavored to exercise much more control over the shaping of the case 
(consistent with an inquisitorial style procedure), a shift that may not be 
supported by the Rome Statute itself.70 Most recently, a Pretrial Chamber 
asserted that it—and not the Prosecutor—could decide whether the interests 
of justice warranted the opening of an investigation even in a case involving 
serious allegations of crimes meeting the statutory criteria.71 
It is vital that the ICC become more successful at managing its trial and 
pretrial process so that cases proceed more efficiently. This is a burden 
shared by the Prosecutor, the Judiciary and, to a lesser extent, the Registry. 
The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), which was heavily criticized especially 
in the Court’s early days, has been responsible for some of the procedural 
and evidentiary problems that have arisen to date, such as the difficulties 
stemming from the Prosecutor’s reliance upon intermediaries in the 
 
Scale of Power: Who is in Charge of the Charges at the International Criminal Court?, in THE ASHGATE 
RESEARCH COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 205 (William A. Schabas, Yvonne 
McDermott & Niamh Hayes, eds., 2013). 
68.  The Pre-Trial Chamber ruled against the practice of “witness proofing” in Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-679, Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing (Nov. 
8, 2006). The Trial Chamber followed suit. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, Decision 
Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, ¶ 5 
(Nov. 30, 2007). These decisions have been criticized. See, e.g., SUSANA SÁCOUTO & KATHERINE 
CLEARY, WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. OF LAW, WITNESS PROOFING AT 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 20 (2009) (recommending that the ICC re-examine its witness 
proofing policy).  
69.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, Decision on Defense Applications 
for Judgments of Acquittal, ¶ 56 (Apr. 5, 2016) (finding that the uncorroborated testimony of a witness 
central to the case could not serve as a basis for proper conviction); Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC-
01/04-01/10-465-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 119 (Dec. 16, 2011) (noting the lack 
of corroboration of the testimonies of several witnesses); Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-432, 
Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 30 (June 3, 2013) (explaining the 
Chamber’s approach to evidence and, notably, the Chamber’s reluctance to accept anonymous hearsay 
from different documentary evidence as corroborating each other). 
70.  Jacobs, supra note 67, at 214, 218-19.  
71.  Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17, Decision Pursuant to Art.15 of 
the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of 
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Lubanga case,72 and indicting defendants without sufficiently 
comprehensive investigations and evidence.73 At the same time, the judicial 
chambers of the Court must increase the speed and consistency with which 
they apply the Statute.  While a return to a more adversarial approach may 
not be the solution, the Court needs to operate as a criminal court, not as an 
international bureaucracy. Defendants have the right to be tried in a 
reasonably short period of time, victims need redress sooner rather than 
later, and it is expensive and inefficient for trials to drag on for years. During 
a 2019 retreat, the judges finally adopted time-frames for the rendering of 
key decisions.74 
The Prosecutor has also responded to many of the legitimate criticisms 
directed at the office by adopting policies and strategies to guide its 
activities, including policies on case selection and prioritization,75 on 
victims’ participation,76 on children,77 on sexual and gender-based 
violence,78 and on the interests of justice.79 In 2013, OTP also adopted a 
code of conduct for the office, two reports on prosecutorial strategy, and a 
 
72.  Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment Pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute (Mar. 
14, 2012). 
73.  Id. 
74.  ICC Judges update Chambers Practice Manual to include timeframes for the rendering of key 
decisions, https://www.icc-cpi.int/test-new-master/Pages/pr-new.aspx?name=PR1502 
[https://perma.cc/3THY-DH4Q]. 
75.  INT’L CRIMINAL COURT OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, POLICY PAPER ON CASE SELECTION AND 
PRIORITISATION (2016) https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-
Selection_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/UUL4-5MVK]. 




77.  INT’L CRIMINAL COURT OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, POLICY ON CHILDREN (2016) 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/20161115_OTP_ICC_Policy-on-Children_Eng.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/T224-7MZE]. 
78.  INT’L CRIMINAL COURT OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, POLICY PAPER ON SEXUAL AND GENDER-
BASED CRIMES (2014) https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/Policy_Paper_on_Sexual_and_Gender-
Based_Crimes-20_June_2014-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG2A-QXBW]. 
79.  INT’L CRIMINAL COURT OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, POLICY PAPER ON THE INTERESTS OF 
JUSTICE (2007) https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09-
73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf. [https://perma.cc/E3XC-B4SM]. 
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strategic plan,80 which was updated recently.81 That said, the Office has 
acknowledged the need to conduct better and more comprehensive 
investigations before moving cases to the confirmation stage.  
 
2. Improving the Quality of the Court’s judgments and its Jurisprudence 
 
 As I noted in a recent posting about the Appeals Chamber’s decision in 
the Bemba case in 2019,82 some of the Court’s recent judgments exhibit 
what the late Antonin Scalia called “judicial-speculation-made-law.”83 
Rather than heavily footnoted and methodologically consistent approaches 
to the solution of legal problems, some judgments have been thinly 
footnoted or unfootnoted discussions of the law which are seemingly bereft 
of clear and coherent methodology. The three-two split in the Bemba case 
was particularly problematic in this regard, not just because of the revised 
standard of review the Appeals Chamber seemed to adopt, but because of 
the insertion of the concept of remoteness into the doctrine of command 
responsibility at the ICC.  Although the remoteness standard only garnered 
two votes,84 it introduced ambiguity into a core principle of international 
humanitarian law. Although Bemba may not be decisive to future cases on 
the meaning of Article 28, the fact that two judges “discovered” this 
suddenly dispositive factor on appeal could have a chilling effect on future 
cases.  It incentivizes defense lawyers to raise every conceivable argument, 
hoping to convince judges to accept them even if they represent novel or 
unprecedented theories; it could render trials longer as the law of the ICC 
becomes increasingly unsettled; it may upset victim communities (as was 
the case in Bemba); and the presence of thinly footnoted judicial opinions 
raises legitimacy questions about the Court’s jurisprudence. Judgments that 
 
80.  Policies and Strategies, INT’L CRIM. CT. https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp/Pages/otp-
policies.aspx [https://perma.cc/MHV6-DCKJ]. 
81.  INT’L CRIMINAL COURT OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, STRATEGIC PLAN 2019-2021 (July 17, 
2019) https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20190726-strategic-plan-eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VMJ8-M7WF]. 
82.  See Leila N. Sadat, Fiddling While Rome Burns? The Appeals Chamber’s Curious Decision in 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierra Bemba Gombo, EJIL: TALK! (June 12, 2018), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/fiddling-while-rome-burns-the-appeals-chambers-curious-decision-in-
prosecutor-v-jean-pierre-bemba-gombo/ [https://perma.cc/526B-VNFJ]. 
83.  See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010).  
84.  See Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, Judgment Pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute 
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read more like personal opinions—as opposed to carefully reasoned 
opinions resting upon legal precedent—raise the concern that the judges are 
engaging in unwarranted judicial activism rather than undertaking a careful 
exegesis of the travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute, a systemic 
examination of existing legal precedent, and the sources of law set out in 
Article 21 of the Statute. 
This has been a concern of many close readers of the ICC’s judgments 
for some time. It seems to have been the approach taken by Chambers 
deciding to import the “control of the crime” theory into Article 25(3) of the 
Statute, which was both unprecedented and problematic, as I have written 
elsewhere.85  It is also evidenced by the controversy regarding the acquittal 
of Laurent Gbagbo, which resulted once again in a fractured decision (of a 
Trial Chamber)86 and, because the standard of review for a “no case to 
answer” decision is not clear—and for more than twenty-six weeks after the 
acquittal, no judgment had been issued—it offers little guidance to other 
Chambers or the Prosecutor regarding the appropriate standard to be 
applied.87 It also seems apparent in even a superficial reading of Pretrial 
Chamber II’s recent decision not to allow the Prosecutor to open an 
investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, relying for the first time on 
a novel—and once again unfootnoted—analysis of the “interests of justice” 
in Article 53(1) of the Rome Statute.88  One commentator has described the 
Afghan decision (which was later reversed on appeal) as a “judicial 
meltdown”89 and four distinguished supporters and leaders of the Court 
 
85.  Leila N. Sadat & Jarrod M. Jolly, Seven Canons of ICC Treaty Interpretation: Making Sense of 
Article 25’s Rorschach Blot, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 755 (2014).   
86.  See Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15-1263, Reasons for Oral Decision of 15 January 2019 
(July 16, 2019); see also text accompanying supra note 16. 
87.  Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15-1263. The oral decision was rendered on January 15, 2019; the written 
reasons followed on July 16, 2019. Id. 
88.  Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17, Decision Pursuant to Art.15 of 
the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, ¶¶ 87-96 (Apr. 12, 2019). The only source cited in those four pages is the Prosecutor’s 
Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice. Id. 
89.  Sergey Vasiliev, Not Just Another ‘Crisis’: Could the Blocking of the Afghanistan Investigation 
Spell the End of the ICC? (Part I), EJIL: TALK! (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/not-just-
another-crisis-could-the-blocking-of-the-afghanistan-investigation-spell-the-end-of-the-icc-part-i/ 
[https://perma.cc/8F5T-K6CS]. 
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concluded shortly after its issuance that the ICC “needs fixing,” due in part 
to the poor quality of some of the Court’s judgements.90  
Legal realists may not find this surprising. They may assume that 
politics is at play, or perhaps that “what the judge had for breakfast” 
explains more about the outcome of a particular case than an analysis of the 
law.91  While a well-established court can probably weather criticism of the 
kind now being directed at the ICC, a young court cannot.  In a world in 
which it is struggling to gain a foothold, establish its legitimacy, and win 
the trust of States and civil society, recent missteps suggest that the Court’s 
judiciary should reconsider its approach. In particular, Chambers could 
refrain from issuing decisions seriatim and with so many dissents. Chief 
Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court offers a useful model. 
He helped that once-frail institution into the powerhouse it is today by 
insisting upon unity and collegiality on the part of his brethren.92 He also 
insisted that the Court pay attention to the norm of stare decisis.93 As with 
the United States Constitution, or the Treaty of Rome establishing the 
European Economic Community in 1957, the ICC Statute is complex, and 
its interpretation difficult, presenting the ICC’s judges with many 
challenges. However, like the judges of the European Court of Justice and 
the United States Supreme Court, the judges of the International Criminal 
Court must find a way to navigate these complexities to build trust and 
confidence in their institution.  
 
3. Striving for Universality of Ratification, and Increased State Support 
 
The world of 2020 is not the world of 1998. The 1990s were a time of 
conflict, but also of hope following the end of the Cold War, seeing a new 
emphasis on human rights and international law.94 Twenty years later, the 
cold war seems resurgent as the Security Council is paralyzed by bitter 
 
90.  Zeid Raad Al Hussein, Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Christian Wenaweser & Tiina Intelman, The 
International Criminal Court Needs Fixing, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Apr. 24, 2019), 
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-international-criminal-court-needs-fixing 
[https://perma.cc/FV3F-2V3D]. 
91.  This quote is often attributed to Jerome Frank, although scholars dispute the likelihood of him 
actually making this claim. See FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER (2009) 129, n. 15. 
92.  Charles F. Hobson, Defining the Office: John Marshall as Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1421 
(2006). 
93.  Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018 (1996). 
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disagreements between the great powers, particularly the Russian 
Federation, China, and the United States. This has made action on some of 
the worst atrocity situations in the world (Syria, for example) impossible, 
leading to establishment of other mechanisms by the General Assembly like 
the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria.95  
Ratifications of the Rome Statute have slowed considerably, leaving 
seventy States and many major powers outside the Rome Statute system, a 
situation that is unlikely to dramatically improve soon. As noted above, two 
States that have been the subject of preliminary examinations have 
withdrawn from the Statute in response,96 which is their sovereign right, but 
worrying. Talk of a “mass exodus” of African Union members has 
punctuated discussions about the Court at its annual Assembly of States 
Parties meetings for the past few years,97 sparked by indictments of African 
leaders who fought their battles both in and outside the courtroom,98 
attacking the Court politically as well as the specific cases against them, and 
even, as discussed below, attempting to amend or reinterpret key Rome 
Statute provisions in their favor to preserve their immunity from the Court’s 
jurisdiction.99  
 
95.  Established on December 21, 2016, by G.A. Res. 71/248.  See INT’L, IMPARTIAL & INDEP. 
MECHANISM, https://iiim.un.org/ [https://perma.cc/UW7S-GMQC]. 
96.  Burundi notified the UN Secretary-General of its withdrawal on October 27, 2016, which came 
into effect on October 27, 2017.  INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, REPORT ON 
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES ¶ 289 (2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017-
PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/EVY4-4HKJ].  The Philippines deposited a written 
notification of withdrawal on March 17, 2018.  Int’l Criminal Court, supra note 31. 
97.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Civil Soc’y Orgs. to Afr. States Parties of the Int’l Crim. Ct. for the 
Assembly of States Parties 14th Session 2 (Nov. 17, 2015) (“In January [2015, then] African Union 
Chair President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe threatened to push for ICC withdrawal by African 
states.”); Sidiki Kaba, President, Assembly of States Parties, Speech at the Fifteenth Session of the 
Assembly of States Parties (Nov. 16, 2016), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/ASP15-
Opening-Statement-PASP-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z8J-UPKS]. 
98.  See, e.g., John Mukum Mbaku, Africa and the International Criminal Court: Is There Room for 
Cooperation?, GEO. J. INT’L AFF. (Apr. 26, 2017), 
https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/africa-and-the-international-
criminal-court-is-there-room-for-cooperation [https://perma.cc/UQ9M-XS8B] (noting that the ICC 
faces difficulty enforcing arrest warrants due to lack of cooperation of many African countries, and that 
South Africa notably refused to turn in Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir following his indictment). 
99.  See generally Yvonne M. Dutton, Bridging the Legitimacy Divide: The International Criminal 
Court’s Domestic Perception Challenge, 56 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 71, 109 (2017); Int’l Criminal 
Court Assembly of State Parties, Rep. of the Working Group on Amendments on its Thirteenth Session, 
ICC-ASP/13/31, at ¶ 12 (2014) (introducing Kenya’s proposal to amend Article 27 of the Rome Statute 
to provide immunity to heads of state). 
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The hostility of the United States has also posed a major challenge for 
the Court, as noted above.100 Although instrumental in the establishment of 
the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in the 
1990s, and relatively supportive in terms of funding, intelligence sharing, 
and the secondment of personnel, the U.S. government has historically been 
on the fence about the establishment of a permanent international criminal 
court.101 While a lack of U.S. support may not be fatal to the Court, it has 
weakened it. It has jeopardized the ability of countries to cooperate with the 
Court (due in part to the Article 98 Agreement campaign, which targeted 
both State and non-States Parties). It also deprived the Court of financial 
and logistical support. Some argue that the Court is not evenhanded because 
it cannot compel U.S. persons to appear before it even though the United 
States has participated in Security Council referrals to the Court in three 
cases involving non-States Parties (while exempting or attempting to 
exempt its own nationals from the Court’s jurisdiction): Sudan,102 Libya103 
and Syria.104 This gives rise to the appearance—and perhaps the reality—of 
double standards, which erodes the Court’s perceived legitimacy.  
The Prosecutor’s request to open an investigation into the situation in 
Afghanistan, which implicated U.S. persons and policies, obviated some of 
the critique directed towards the ICC itself, but led to other difficulties as 
the Court found itself on the receiving end (again) of blistering attacks from 
the U.S. government.105 There is also speculation that the Pretrial 
Chamber’s decision finding that the investigation could not be opened “in 
the interests of justice” was a direct result of U.S. pressure, undermining the 
Court’s legitimacy and independence. The U.S. attacks on the Court harm 
not only the ICC, but the United Nations more generally, given the Rome 
 
100.  See, e.g., Göran Sluiter, The International Criminal Court, 23 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 480, 480-82 
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Statute’s importance within the United Nations system. It also divides the 
United States from some of its closest allies, nearly all of whom are States 
Parties, including Britain, Canada, France, Japan, and South Korea.  
The absence of Russia, China, and India is equally problematic, but for 
different reasons; these are populous, powerful and influential States, they 
are nuclear-armed, and, like the United States, two can refer situations to 
the Court and, under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, suspend an 
investigation in their capacity as members of the U.N. Security Council.106 
Unlike the United States, their opposition has not included an aggressive 
campaign against the Court for the most part, but in non-ratification of the 
Statute. The Russian Federation took this a step further, however, by 
repudiating its signature (like the United States107) on November 16, 2016, 
following the publication of a report by the Prosecutor referring to Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea as an occupation.108   
Following the indictment of President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan in 2009, 
members of the African Union (AU), angered by the perception that the 
Court was “targeting Africa,” invoked some of the arguments the United 
States had offered at Rome, as well as their own concerns, and launched a 
new campaign against the Court. Sudan asserted that the Court was a 
“political organ of the EU . . . built to indict Africans,” and that it would not 
comply (even though the Security Council had referred the situation) since 
Sudan was not a “party to the Rome treaty.”109 The AU campaign involved 
a refusal to arrest Omar al-Bashir during his international travels (including 
to ICC States Parties);110 an effort to persuade the Security Council to defer 
the Sudan case (and later the Kenya cases, which also involved indictments 
of a head of state); attempting to amend the Statute to permit the General 
Assembly (as opposed to the Security Council) to suspend an investigation 
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or prosecution;111 long sessions at the ICC Assembly of States Parties on 
“Indictment of Sitting Heads of State and Government and its Consequences 
on Peace and Stability and Reconciliation”112 (and similar topics such as 
“Africa and the ICC” in subsequent years); the adoption of Rule of 
Procedure and Evidence 134 quater to permit heads of state to be excused 
from trial and represented by counsel only;113 and the adoption of a new 
treaty, the Malabo Protocol,114 providing for immunity for heads of state in 
contravention of customary international law and the Rome Statute. In a 
recent decision, the ICC Appeals Chamber found that States are required to 
arrest al-Bashir and to cooperate with the Court, rejecting his claims for 
immunity.115  Yet that, too, has generated significant dissent.116  
Given the difficult political environment that the Court faces, which is 
not likely to improve any time soon, the Court must endeavor to nonetheless 
satisfy its supporters and win over its detractors. The Court alone cannot 
change the political framework within which it operates, and much of the 
blowback is due to the fact that, as Bill Pace, convener of the CICC, noted 
at the opening of the Court’s permanent premises, “the Court is working.” 
At the same time, the Court can engage in much more extensive outreach to 
explain its activities and do the kind of “public diplomacy” necessary for an 
institution to earn public support and trust. It can do more to educate the 
public about its work, make its website much more user friendly, work with 
others to produce books and videos explaining its importance, and engage 
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in more victim-centered activities that underscore the importance of justice 
and reparations for afflicted communities. 
 
4. Adjusting Outside Expectations and Reactions 
 
Another important point about ICC reform is that external stakeholders 
need to be both more exacting, and, at the same time, more patient and 
practical with respect to the Court. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
Court and the idea of potential prosecution looms large in the minds of many 
leaders.117 Likewise, interviews with victims of atrocity crimes suggest that 
victims have unrealistic expectations of the International Criminal Court 
and its power.118 This was also true with respect to the ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals, where victim communities in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda believed that those tribunals had much more power than they did.119 
It is probably worth observing that national criminal justice systems also 
tend to disappoint victims, with their clinical approach to criminal justice, 
and their emphasis on conviction rather than rehabilitation of the offender 
or restoration of the community.120 These problems are magnified at the 
international level. International criminal justice is harsh medicine, and is 
only part of a response that must be much broader and holistic especially in 
cases of mass atrocities. Removing perpetrators from communities so those 
communities are safe is important, but the ICC can only take a handful of 
cases. National systems must be able to act to pick up the slack, or, in some 
cases, perhaps regional or hybrid tribunals may be required. In addition to 
addressing the problems of perpetrators, the need for truth may require the 
establishment of a truth commission in addition to formal criminal 
accountability. Reparations need to be sufficient, but the Trust Fund for 
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Victims may not have the resources.  Communities must be rebuilt, and 
survivors will need medical treatment, adequate food, clean water, and 
psychological counseling in order to heal. David Luban once referred to 
crimes against humanity as “politics gone cancerous.”121 If international 
criminal justice is necessary to stopping the spread of the cancer, other 
healing modalities must accompany justice mechanisms to address the deep 
wounds of a community afflicted by trauma and violence.  
 
5. Continuing to Build National and Regional Infrastructure for the 
Prosecution of International Crime 
 
It bears repeating that the International Criminal Court Statute is 
premised on the doctrine of complementarity, meaning that national systems 
need to take up the task of international criminal justice for it to be effective. 
Only when national systems are unable or unwilling to act is a case 
admissible before the International Criminal Court. Although it is not the 
ICC’s job to reinforce national systems, States can and should do so, and 
the Court can certainly be a partner in those important outreach and legacy 
activities. One important lesson drawn from the experience of the 
Yugoslavia Tribunal was its profound catalytic effect on national systems 
in the former Yugoslavia. As Diane Orentlicher recently wrote in Some Kind 
of Justice, “one of the Tribunal’s signal achievements[was] its role in 
catalyzing domestic war crimes prosecutions, a function no one anticipated 




The shadow of the International Criminal Court looms large in the mind 
of victim groups, civil society advocates, governmental officials, rebel 
leaders, the media, and even in the decisions of national courts. The annual 
meeting of the Court’s Assembly of States Parties provides an opportunity 
to bring together States, NGOs and other stakeholders to discuss not only 
matters of importance to the ICC itself, but global justice, peace and security 
more generally.  At the international level, an institution focused upon 
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global justice with a seat at the table when discussing conflicts or human 
rights abuses has changed the equation in a way that is hard to quantify, but 
is deeply significant. At the domestic level, the ICC has inspired national 
systems to create courts and bring cases—an example of “positive 
complementarity” catalyzed by the Rome Statute system as well.   
 The international community establishes institutions like the ICC to 
fulfill specific societal needs.  There is no evidence that the needs that the 
ICC was established to meet—the needs of victims for justice; the need of 
peace and security and the moral imperative of an international legal order 
that is both just and fair —are less pressing than they were in 1998.  Indeed, 
recent events and the ICC’s burgeoning docket suggest the ICC is needed 
more than ever. Nor is it at all clear that the ICC cannot be an important 
institutional player in helping to achieve these goals. What the evidence 
does suggest is that the Assembly of States Parties and other internal and 
external stakeholders should undertake targeted reforms to help the Court 
achieve these objectives. For this reason, this Article argues that the 
“Leave” campaign, with its emphasis on sovereigntist concerns, misses the 
point. Instead, scholars and political leaders should Lean In to the work 
needed to bring about these reforms, and do so in a constructive manner that 
has the potential to strengthen the institution in both the short and long term. 
The establishment of the Court traversed seventy-five years of history, from 
Versailles to Nuremberg and finally to Rome, enduring along the way two 
world wars, two atomic bombs, and untold death and misery. The road from 
Rome to The Hague was shorter, but the ultimate success of the institution 
is not yet assured.  
As theorist and World War II survivor Albert Hirschman argues in The 
Rhetoric of Reaction, progressive movements for positive social change—
and the institutions that embody them—will always be met with the 
rhetorical responses of perversity, futility, and jeopardy.123 Each one of 
these arguments has been leveled against the ICC in some measure: it (like 
other international tribunals) has been accused of increasing conflict 
through the issuance of indictments (perversity); of being a “futile” 
institution that cannot achieve its stated objectives; and of jeopardizing 
existing arrangements (such as South African-style truth-and-reconciliation 
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commissions).124 As Hirschman notes, the arguments of perversity, futility, 
and jeopardy ignore synergies that new reforms create, are insufficiently 
attentive to the imminence of danger, and ignore the arc of history,125 which, 
to paraphrase the late Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., bends towards 
justice.126 During the Eighteenth Assembly of States Parties (ASP) held in 
The Hague in December 2019, the ASP created a committee of 
distinguished experts to examine the Court’s record, and make 
recommendations for its improved performance in the areas of governance, 
the judiciary, and prosecution and investigations.127 Their report, which will 
be submitted by September 30, 2020, will hopefully help the Court to “Lean 
In” to the challenges currently facing it.
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